

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 090587

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, SU

SUBJECT: NPT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR US-UK-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS

1. OBJECTIVE IS TO COMPARE NOTES WITH THE OTHER TWO PARTICIPANTS ON WHAT ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO ARISE AT CONFERENCE AND ON CURRENT THINKING OF DEPOSITARIES ON HOW TO COPE WITH SUCH ISSUES.

2. SECURITY ASSURANCES: WHILE THE LIKELIHOOD OF PRESSURES FOR NON-USE ASSURANCES SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED, DELEGATION SHOULD AVOID ANY INDICATION THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONFIDENTIAL

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ACQUIESCE IN SUCH ASSURANCES. DELEGATION MAY QUESTION THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ON HOW THEY WOULD REACT IF ANOTHER DELEGATION URGED AN INITIATIVE OF THE TYPE SUGGESTED BY THE JAPANESE, BUT SHOULD NOT REVEAL OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT

THE JAPANESE ARE THINKING OF SUCH AN INITIATIVE.

3. ALL THREE DEPOSITARIES WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CRITICISMS OF SC RES 255 AS HAVING BECOME PRACTICALLY WORTHLESS. WHILE WE CAN CITE THE POLITICAL VALUE OF ALL THREE DEPOSITARIES HAVING AGREED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR THREAT TO A NNWS PARTY TO THE TREATY, AND THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM TAKING ACTION OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF, WE SHOULD NOT PLACE OUR

EMPHASIS ON SC RES 255. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD STRESS THE VALUE OF THE TREATY ITSELF AS HELPFUL TO THE SECURITY OF NNWS, ESPECIALLY WHERE HOSTILE NEIGHBORS HAVE JOINED IT.

4. PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT: WE WILL STRESS THE SALT AGREEMENTS AS RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE VI, AND IMPORTANCE OF THE NPT TO MAKING POSSIBLE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. IF THE UNITED KINGDOM INDICATES INTENTION TO SUGGEST FURTHER STUDY OF A QUOTA TEST BAN AT CCD, WE SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD NOT FIND SUCH AN INITIATIVE HELPFUL.

5. TTB WILL INEVITABLY COME UP AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY CRITICISM IT HAS EVOKED, IT WOULD SEEM UNWISE TO HIGHLIGHT IT. HOWEVER, WE CAN NOTE THAT IT REPRESENTS A FURTHER STEP IN THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AND NOTE THAT THE PARTIES AGREED IN ARTICLE I(3) TO CONTINUE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD ACHIEVING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CESSATION OF ALL UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. WE CAN ALSO NOTE THAT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DEAL--AN AGREEMENT ON HOW TO HANDLE PNE EXPLOSIONS--IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND THUS THAT THE FULL IMPACT OF THE MEASURE CANNOT BE PROPERLY ASSESSED AT THIS TIME.

6. WE ASSUME ALL THREE PARTIES CAN AGREE TO RESIST ANY
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ATTEMPTS AT REVCON TO IMPOSE DEADLINES ON ACHIEVEMENT OF A CTB OR OTHER DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS.

7. NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY--PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: DEL SHOULD CITE OUR ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE IAEA THAT SPECIAL CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO NPT PARTIES IN THE ALLOCATION OF IN-KIND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WE MAKE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE IAEA, AND THE FACT THAT WE ARE INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF SUCH IN-KIND ASSISTANCE. DEL SHOULD SUGGEST THAT A SIMILAR MOVE BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

8. NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY-SAFEGUARDS ON THE ENTIRE FUEL

CYCLE: PRESSURES WILL ARISE AT THE CONFERENCE FOR PARTIES TO REQUIRE, AS A CONDITION OF FUTURE SUPPLY, SAFEGUARDS ON THE ENTIRE FUEL CYCLE OF THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY. (THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY THINK THIS SHOULD BE DONE.) AT THE TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, WE SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO AWAIT THE DISCUSSION AT THE PREPARATORY SESSION OF THE SUPPLIERS' CONFERENCE, TO BE HELD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE TRILATERALS, BEFORE FORMULATING A POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT, SINCE THE POSITION OF OTHER KEY SUPPLIERS WOULD BE A KEY FACTOR IN THE FEASIBILITY OF ANY SUCH CHANGE IN POLICY.

BILITY OF ANY SUCH CHANGE IN POLICY.

9. CHEMICAL REPROCESSING: WHILE THIS WILL BE DISCUSSED MORE FULLY AT THE EXPLORATORY MEETING FOR THE SUPPLIERS' CONFERENCE, WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR READINESS TO SUPPORT RECOGNITION BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING SAFER AND MORE ECONOMICAL WAYS OF MEETING FUTURE REPROCESSING NEEDS.

10. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS: THE THREE STATES MAY NOT BE PREPARED TO ACT IN COORDINATED FASHION ON PNES. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR US POSITION THAT WE CONSIDER ARTICLE V TO BE ESSENTIALLY AN UNDERTAKING OF NWS NOT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NNWS PARTIES TO EXPLOIT PNES FOR THEMSELVES WITHOUT MAKING THE BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO NNWS PARTIES TO THE TREATY. (THIS IS HOW WE EXPLAINED MATTER TO THE U.S. SENATE, AND IS OBVIOUSLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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POSITION OF THE UK, WHICH HAS THE SAME OBLIGATION AS WE DO, BUT HAS NOT DEVELOPED PNES.) WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT OTHERS MAY CHALLENGE THIS INTERPRETATION, BUT THAT IT IS NONETHELESS THE CORRECT ONE IN OUR VIEW.

11. WE SHOULD ASK HOW THE SOVIETS INTEND TO HANDLE ARTICLE V QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE ERICSSON REPORT (WHICH HAS NOW BEEN DISTRIBUTED AS A CONFERENCE DOCUMENT) INDICATING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REDUCED SEVERAL APPLICATIONS TO COMMERCIAL PRACTICE.

12. WE SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE PLAN TO ACKNOWLEDGE AT THE CONFERENCE THAT THE EXCAVATION APPLICATION OF PNES IS SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE LTBT.

13. PHYSICAL SECURITY: WE WOULD EXPECT ALL THREE COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT IT BE DEALT WITH BY AN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AND BY MAKING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT A CONDITION FOR EXPORT OF SENSITIVE MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.

14. SAFEGUARDS MATTERS: IMPROVEMENT AND GREATER SUPPORT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS WILL BE A NON-CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE US SAFEGUARDS OFFER AND SEEK TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER ANY KIND OF AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE TO SUGGESTIONS AT THE CONFERENCE THAT SOME SOVIET FACILITIES SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO SAFEGUARDS.

15. FINAL PRODUCT OF THE CONFERENCE: WE ARE PREPARED TO RESIST STRONGLY ANY AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY OR INDIRECT AMENDMENTS BY PROTOCOLS AND ASSUME UK AND SOVIETS WILL TAKE SAME POSITION. WE BELIEVE ALL THREE SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO CHANNEL THE CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES INTO THE ADOPTION OF A FINAL DECLARATION BASED ON A GENUINE CONSENSUS OF THE PARTIES. DELEGATION MAY OFFER PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON UK DRAFT DECLARATION, AND DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER APPROACHES TO THE DRAFTING OF SUCH A DECLARATION (USING APRIL 9 DRAFT CIRCULATED TO VPWG FOR ILLUSTRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL

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PURPOSES WITH APPROPRIATE DISCLAIMERS.) DELEGATION SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE ONLY PRELIMINARY, SINCE THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION WILL OBVIOUSLY BE AFFECTED BY THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

16. FOLLOW-ON REVIEW CONFERENCE: DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE WE DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE IN SUGGESTING DECISION ON A SECOND CONFERENCE IN 1980, BUT THAT WE CONSIDER THIS IS LIKELY TO BE DECIDED UPON BY THE CONFERENCE. DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD STRONGLY RESIST ANY ATTEMPT TO ACCELERATE SUCH A REVIEW CONFERENCE OR TO ESTABLISH NEW MACHINERY FOR REVIEW IN THE INTERIM. KISSINGER

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